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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than half a century, diamond-rich African nations 
such as Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (“DRC”) were—and in some cases, continue to be—plagued 
by vicious civil wars financed principally by trade in rough 
“conflict diamonds” mined within their borders.  Proceeds from 
the illicit trade of diamonds were consistently used to purchase 
weapons and thus to fuel long-running conflicts in African 
nations.1  In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(“KPCS”) was created as a means of regulating trade in rough 
diamonds while protecting the legitimate diamond industry, upon 
which numerous nations, in Africa and around the globe, rely.2  
The United Nations (“U.N.”)-backed KPCS imposes requirements 
related to the movement, import, and export of rough diamonds on 
all participants in order to prevent conflict and illicit diamonds 
from entering legitimate channels of trade.3 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 2005, 
Cornell University.  The Author would like to express her gratitude to her family 
and friends for their support and encouragement, as well as to all those who 
assisted with this endeavor by offering their time and expertise. 
1 See infra Section 2.2.2. 
2 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, http://www.kimberleyprocess 
.com/documents/basic_core_documents_en.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) 
[hereinafter KPCS]. 
3 Margo Kaplan, Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the 
Diamond Trade, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 559, 587 (2003). 
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In 2004, the Republic of Congo (“ROC”)—which, due to its 
conspicuously low export tax, geographic proximity, and corrupt 
and unstable political environment, served as the primary 
destination for conflict and illicit diamonds being smuggled out of 
the DRC and other nations—was expelled from the Kimberley 
Process (“KP”).4  However, expulsion from the KP has not 
eradicated the ROC’s illegal diamond-related activities.5   Such 
illicit trade continues to have significant adverse economic and 
non-economic consequences for neighboring resource-rich nations 
and for citizens of the impoverished ROC, as well.  Due to its lack 
of international systems of monitoring and enforcement, the KPCS 
has, in the past, proved unsuccessful at eliminating the flow of 
illicitly traded diamonds out of the ROC.  In spite of this fact, and 
despite its post-expulsion record of illegal trade, the ROC was 
readmitted to the KP in November 2007.6  KP officials have yet to 
proffer any concrete explanation as to the grounds for this 
decision.   
Accordingly, as a means of both preventing illicitly traded 
diamonds from entering legitimate channels of trade and restoring 
diverted and much-needed revenues to the government and 
citizens in a transparent way, the Republic of Congo should raise 
its export tax on diamonds to a level commensurate with that of 
similarly situated nations.  Should the ROC choose not to comply 
with a request from the international community to increase the 
 
4 See Christian Dietrich, Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its Neighbors 16 (The Diamonds and 
Human Sec. Project, Occasional Paper No. 4, 2002) (“Diamond regulations in 
Congo-Brazzaville [(as the ROC is also known)] are lax, and taxes are low, major 
attractions for corrupt international diamond dealers positioning themselves 
along African smuggling routes.”); see also Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a 
Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 25, 33, 41 
(2005) (describing the ROC’s history of exporting smuggled diamonds and the 
nation’s 2004 removal from the KP). 
5 See GLOBAL WITNESS, LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: SUMMARY OF 
RESULTS OF DIAMOND TRADE STATISTICS REVIEW (2007), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/605/en/loopholes_in 
_the_kimberley_process_summary_of_trad (“Trade with Congo-Brazzaville 
accounted for the vast majority of illegal trade, despite the fact that the country 
was expelled from the Kimberley Process in July 2004.”) [hereinafter LOOPHOLES 
IN THE KP]. 
6 Kimberley Process, 2007 Kimberley Process Communiqué 1 (Nov. 8, 2007), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/kimb/docs/communique 
_2007.pdf (last visited, Oct. 25, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 KP Communiqué]. 
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relevant tax, possible means of persuasion include the threat of or 
actual expulsion from the KP and similar threats of or actual 
imposition of sanctions by the United States (“U.S.”).  In addition 
to raising its export tax on diamonds, the ROC should, with 
international support, act to increase transparency in government 
and natural resource extraction and to implement an anti-
corruption plan.  Such modifications will likely also have a positive 
effect on the debt-ridden ROC’s ability to attract international 
investment opportunities. 
Section 2 of this Comment offers several definitions of “conflict 
diamonds,” briefly examines the history of such diamonds in 
Africa, and provides information on the international response to 
the conflict diamond issue.  Section 3 focuses on the ROC’s role in 
this ongoing problem, beginning with background information on 
the country, followed by a discussion of its history of involvement 
in the illicit diamond trade, its resultant expulsion from the KP, 
and the relatively minor consequences that have stemmed 
therefrom.  Section 3 also illustrates the KPCS’ inability, as 
currently formulated, to prevent all conflict and illicit diamonds 
from entering legitimate channels of trade, and notes the effects of 
such illicit trade on resource-rich nations neighboring the ROC.  
Section 4 reiterates the failure of the KPCS to regulate the flow of 
illicitly traded diamonds out of the ROC, argues that the ROC 
should raise its export tax on diamonds, and includes possible 
means of coercing the ROC to do so, should they prove necessary.  
Finally, Section 5 discusses prospects for change in the ROC and 
consequently, in neighboring nations. 
2. CONFLICT DIAMONDS IN AFRICA AND THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
2.1. Conflict Diamonds Exposed 
The United Nations defines “conflict diamonds” as “diamonds 
that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed 
to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are 
used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or 
in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.”7  With 
respect to Africa specifically, London-based non-governmental 
 
7 United Nations Department of Public Information, General Assembly 
Adopts Resolution on ‘Conflict Diamonds’ (Mar. 21, 2001), http://www.un.org 
/peace/africa/Diamond.html. 
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organization (“NGO”) Global Witness8 provides a working 
definition for conflict diamonds as “diamonds which originate 
from areas in Africa controlled by forces fighting the legitimate 
and internationally recognized government of the relevant 
country.”9 
For those purposes contemplated by the KPCS, namely, an 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds,10 conflict 
diamonds are defined as: 
[R]ough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies 
to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate 
governments, as described in relevant United Nations 
Security Council (“UNSC”) resolutions insofar as they 
remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions 
which may be adopted in the future, and as understood 
and recognised in United Nations General Assembly 
(“UNGA”) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA 
resolutions which may be adopted in future.11 
 
8 Global Witness, About Us, http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en 
/about_us.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (focusing on exposing and breaking the 
links between the corrupt exploitation of natural resources and conflicts, 
corruption, and human rights abuses). 
9 GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: POSSIBILITIES FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, 
CERTIFICATION, AND CONTROL OF DIAMONDS 1 (2000), available at http://www 
.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/86/en/conflict _diamonds.  Global 
Witness further explains that with respect to Africa specifically, “[d]iamonds that 
originate from areas under the control of forces that are in opposition to elected 
and internationally recognized governments, or are in any way connected to those 
groups should be considered as conflict diamonds.” Id. 
10 KPCS, supra note 2, Section 1. 
11 Id.  Simply put, “rough” diamonds are those that have yet to be cut or 
polished.  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 2.  The KPCS 
defines “rough diamonds” as “diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, 
cleaved or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised Commodity 
Description and Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31.”  KPCS, supra note 
2, Section 1.  “Diamonds” are defined to mean “a natural mineral consisting 
essentially of pure crystallized carbon in the isometric system, with a hardness on 
the Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity of approximately 3.52 and a 
refractive index of 2.42.”  Id. 
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2.2. Conflict Diamonds in Africa—A Brief History 
2.2.1. Practicality of Using Diamonds to Fund Conflict 
Diamonds have a number of characteristics that contribute to 
their proven effectiveness as a source of funding for rebel 
insurgencies and terrorists in Africa.12  Diamonds are small in size, 
highly fungible,13 easily concealed, and quite difficult to trace and 
police.14  They are frequently referred to as the world’s most 
concentrated form of wealth.15  As a convertible form of wealth,16 
diamonds appeal to those who wish to move high-value resources 
across borders and yet circumvent interactions with legitimate 
financial institutions.17  The ease with which diamonds may be 
mined also plays a role in their prevalence as a means of funding 
insurgent causes.18  Diamonds can be mined in unstable regions 
using little or no technology, as opposed to other resources such as 
oil and copper, which must be mined on an industrial scale and 
thus require substantial investment and on-site stability.19  In 
addition, diamond mining largely takes place “in the most remote 
and lawless areas of the world.”20 
2.2.2. Nations Devastated by Diamond-Funded Conflicts 
 Diamonds have financed vicious conflicts responsible for the 
death and displacement of millions of people and economic ruin in 
 
12 Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her Shoes: The Kimberley Process 
and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 335, 337 (2007). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO 
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2003); see also 
Global Witness, supra note 8, at 2; see also Woody, supra note 12, at 337 
(“Diamonds . . . consist of a high value-to-weight ratio that does not devalue very 
easily.”). 
16 Diamonds easily function as currency and may be used, for example, “to 
purchase weapons, fund drug deals, launder money, or finance other crimes.” 
Price, supra note 15, at 25; see also Woody, supra note 12, at 337 (explaining that 
sometimes, rough diamonds are sold for cash, while at other times, they are 
directly exchanged for weapons). 
17 Price, supra note 15, at 25. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 62. 
20 Malamut, supra note 4, at 27. 
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numerous African countries.21  Angola, Sierra Leone, and the DRC 
have yet to fully recover from the pervasive destruction caused by 
diamond-funded civil wars.22  According to Global Witness, as of 
late 2006, diamonds were still being used for money laundering, 
tax evasion, and organized crime in these nations.23 
Natural resource-rich Angola was plagued by civil wars from 
1961 through 2002.24  The nation gained independence from   
Portugal in 1975.25  From 1975 through 2002, the conflicts in Angola 
were generally dominated by the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (“UNITA”), the country’s leading rebel 
group, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(“MPLA”).26  The MPLA relied on Angola’s oil reserves as its 
means of generating revenue, while UNITA, led by guerrilla leader 
Jonas Savimbi, seized control of the bulk of the nation’s diamond 
mines.27  Angola is one of Africa’s principal diamond resources,28 
and its diamonds rank among the world’s top stones when 
measured by value per carat.29  As such, diamonds proved a key 
source of funding for the UNITA military.30  Apart from serving as 
a means of financing rebel causes, however, control of Angola’s 
diamond mines may have also been an objective of the conflict in 
and of itself.31 
 
21 GLOBAL WITNESS, THE TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS: DIAMONDS AND CONFLICT 1, 
3 (2006), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/data/files/media_library/7 
/en/the_truth_about_diamonds.pdf [hereinafter TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS]. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  See Dietrich, supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that Angola is renowned for 
being among both the world’s top oil and diamond producers); see generally 
GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE: THE ROLE OF COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS IN 
THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1998) (describing the role of diamonds in the Angolan 
conflict from the late-1980s through 1998), available at http://www.globalwitness 
.org/media _library_detail.php/90/en/a_rough_trade [hereinafter A ROUGH 
TRADE]. 
25 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 573. 
26 Price, supra note 15, at 8-10. 
27 Id. at 9. 
28 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 574. 
29 The Cartel Isn’t Forever, ECONOMIST, July 17, 2004, at 60. 
30 From 1992 through 1998, UNITA earned an estimated minimum of 
between $3.7 and $4 billion from sales of Angolan-mined diamonds, much of 
which was dedicated to the funding of “a serious guerrilla offensive.”  Kaplan, 
supra note 3, at 574-575. 
31 UNITA launched two of its major wars during considerable recessions in 
the diamond industry, throughout which it organized repeated attacks on 
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In response to what seemed an undeniable link between 
diamonds and the ongoing Angolan conflict, in 1998 the U.N. 
Security Council (“UNSC”) passed Resolutions 1173 and 1176, a 
key element of which is a prohibition on the direct or indirect 
import of Angolan diamonds not controlled through a 
government-issued certificate of origin.32  The wars in Angola 
resulted in an estimated loss of as many as 1.5 million lives,33 in 
addition to thousands of incidents of maiming caused by active 
landmines.34  As of 2002, when UNITA signed a peace pact with 
the Angolan government, an estimated 4.5 million citizens had 
been displaced.35  The diamond sanctions imposed by the UNSC 
were lifted in 2002.36 
As one commentator aptly noted, “[w]hile the war in Angola 
brought the issue of conflict diamonds to the attention of the U.N. 
and NGOs, Sierra Leone and its now infamous war atrocities 
brought conflict diamonds to the forefront of civil society.”37  From 
1991 through 2002, Sierra Leone was ravaged by civil war of the 
most brutal kind38 when the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) 
and other rebel groups clashed over control of the nation’s 
diamond mines, some of the richest on the planet.39 
In 1991, the RUF, led by former army corporal Foday Sankoh, 
commenced its mission to overthrow then-President Joseph 
Momoh and capture Sierra Leone’s diamond fields.40  Over the 
course of its roughly decade-long campaign for control of the 
 
government mining projects and attempts to shut down Angola’s official mining 
industry.  Id. at 574-575.  Such tactics “made it extremely difficult for the 
government to reap any profit from its diamond resources and turned 
government mining projects into ‘a war zone.’”  Id. at 575. 
32 Id. at 574; S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998); S.C. Res. 
1176, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1176 (June 24, 1998). 
33 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 3. 
34  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1. 
35 Press Release, Security Council, Secretary General’s Special Adviser Briefs 
Security Council on Angola: Says Recent Agreement Creates Brighter Prospects 
for Lasting Peace, U.N. Doc. SC/7372 (Apr. 23, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7372.doc.htm. 
36  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1. 
37 Price, supra note 15, at 12. 
38  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1.  See infra notes 40–49 and 
accompanying text (describing the egregious war atrocities and human rights 
violations that occurred during the civil war). 
39 Price, supra note 15, at 12. 
40 Id. at 13. 
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country’s diamonds, the RUF committed some of the most vicious 
human rights atrocities in recorded history.  Aside from countless 
abductions and murders, these include the mass rape of women 
and children41 and conscription of approximately 12,000 children 
who were then forced to fight among the rebels.42  The most 
outrageous human rights violations, however, for which the RUF is 
most infamous, were its machete-inflicted amputations of citizens’ 
limbs.43  Endeavoring to send the message that people without 
hands could not vote against the RUF, the rebel group mutilated 
more than 20,000 people.44 
Employing such violent tactics, the RUF achieved a mass 
removal of citizens from Sierra Leone’s diamond-rich areas45 and 
mined up to an estimated $125 million worth of diamonds each 
year.46  The RUF traded the stones for weapons, such that Sankoh, 
diamond merchants, and arms dealers alike were profiting from 
the perpetuation of the conflict.47  In addition, diamond smuggling 
was rampant and often facilitated by complicit neighboring 
governments such as that of Liberia.48  Due to the RUF’s activities, 
Sierra Leone’s official diamond exports plummeted and almost 
vanished entirely.49 
Responding to the atrocities plaguing Sierra Leone, in July 
2000, the UNSC passed Resolution 1306; among other things, this 
resolution imposed an embargo against the direct or indirect 
import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone without a valid 
certificate of origin.50  As of March 2001, Resolution 1343 
 
41 Amanda Bryant Banat, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra 
Leone: Proposed Market Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification 
of Origin, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 939, 941 (2002). 
42 Price, supra note 15, at 12. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1.  The up-to-$125 million figure 
is applicable for the years 1991–2002, during which Sierra Leone was engaged in 
civil war.  Id. 
47 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 568. 
48 Id. at 569. 
49 See Price, supra note 15, at 15 (contrasting Sierra Leone’s official diamond 
exports before and during the war; in the 1960s, Sierra Leone exported 
approximately two million carats per year, whereas in 1999, only 9,000 carats were 
officially exported). 
50 S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Decides to Impose Prohibition on Imports of Rough 
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prohibited the import of all rough diamonds from Liberia—
irrespective of the stones’ country of origin—and the supply of 
arms to Liberia.51  By the end of the war in 2002, more than 75,000 
people had perished and 80% of Sierra Leone’s citizens were 
refugees.52  In 2003, the UNSC lifted the diamond sanctions 
imposed on Sierra Leone, and the embargo on Liberian diamonds 
was similarly lifted in 2007.53   
The natural resources of the DRC have been described by at 
least one commentator as possibly “the most opulent on earth.”54  
But despite having mined billions of dollars worth of diamonds,55 
the DRC is exceptionally poor and stands as one of the world’s 
least developed countries.56  Plagued by a long history of 
corruption, bad governance,57 and complex conflict involving both 
domestic and international actors seeking to exploit its precious 
resources, the DRC has been unable to profit from its natural 
wealth.58 
Instead, the nation became embroiled in civil war in 1998, 
which came to involve armies from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi 
(backing Congolese rebels), along with Angola, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe (backing the Congolese government).59  This conflict 
has been referred to as “Africa’s first world war.”60  In 2001, the 
U.N. issued a report in which it explicitly recognized a link 
between the conflict’s prolongation and “the systematic 
 
Diamonds from Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. SC/6886 (July 5, 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2000/20000705.sc6886.doc.html. 
51 S.C. Res. 1343, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001). 
52 Price, supra note 15, at 12-13. 
53  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1; see also Press Release, Global 
Witness & Partnership Africa Canada, Liberia Diamond Ban Lifted: Vigilance 
Needed to Ensure Diamonds Promote Development (Apr. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/540/en/liberia_diamo
nd_ban_lifted_vigilance_needed_to_ensure_diamonds_promote_development 
(reporting the end of the embargo on Liberian diamonds in 2007). 
54 Price, supra note 15, at 16-17. 
55  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 4. 
56 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 1. 
57 Id. at 13. 
58 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 578. 
59 Id. 
60 DR Congo Leader Pledges Peace, BBC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2583735.stm. 
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exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth.”61  The 
largely diamond-driven war ended in 2003, with a staggering 
estimated death toll of over 3 million lives.62 
2.3.  International Response to Conflict Diamonds Issue 
It was impossible for the international community to ignore the 
ghastly situation fueled by the desire for diamonds in Africa.  As 
early as 1998, NGOs such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa 
Canada became actively involved in the campaign to publicize and 
ultimately put an end to the brutal African conflicts both caused 
and funded by diamonds.  These organizations published myriad 
reports condemning the human rights atrocities linked to the 
diamond trade.63  In May 2000, major diamond trading and 
producing countries, diamond industry representatives, and NGOs 
met in Kimberley, South Africa, to discuss ways to confront the 
conflict diamonds issue.  Mindful of the importance of the 
legitimate diamond industry—upon which numerous countries 
rely—the participants began a three-year negotiating process, the 
Kimberley Process, to institute an international certification scheme 
for rough diamonds.64 
Faced with mounting pressures and the risk of a “potentially 
crippling consumer backlash and boycott,” the diamond industry 
was aware that the time was ripe for action.65  At their meeting in 
Antwerp, Belgium in July 2000, the World Federation of Diamond 
Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers 
 
61 See Addendum to the Report by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 26, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (Nov. 
13, 2001), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/630 
/01/PDF/N0163001.pdf?OpenElement (“[T]here is a clear link between the 
continuation of the conflict and the exploitation of natural resources.”). 
62  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 1. 
63 Woody, supra note 12, at 335-36.  See, e.g., A ROUGH TRADE, supra note 24 
(discussing responses to diamond-related conflicts in Angola); see also IAN SMILLIE 
ET AL., PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, 
DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY (2000) (examining human rights and the 
diamond industry in Sierra Leone). 
64 Global Witness, The Kimberley Process, available at http://www 
.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the_kimberley_process.html (last visited Sept. 18, 
2008). 
65 Ann C. Wallis, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United 
Nations’ Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 388, 393 (2005). 
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Association—the two largest international diamond trade 
organizations66—passed a resolution creating the World Diamond 
Council (“WDC”).67  In addition to representatives from the 
diamond industry itself, the WDC was to include emissaries from 
nations where diamonds play a major economic role and the 
international banking sector.68  The WDC was charged with the 
development, implementation, and oversight of a tracking system 
for the import and export of rough diamonds so as to thwart the 
exploitation of diamonds for illicit purposes such as war and the 
infliction of cruelty.69 
In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly 
unanimously adopted Resolution 55/56, recognizing the role of 
diamonds in fueling conflicts.70  This resolution called upon the 
international community to develop and implement a “simple and 
workable international certification scheme for rough diamonds” 
based predominantly on national certification schemes and 
internationally agreed minimum standards.71  In addition to this 
and other related General Assembly resolutions,72 a number of 
UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions for trading in conflict 
diamonds (including those discussed in Section 2.2.2) have also 
“played an active role in responding to and shaping the conflict 
diamond agenda.”73 
After three years of negotiations, the international cooperation 
sought by the U.N. was realized in the form of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme.74  The KPCS, which was put into 
practice in January 2003, is an international certification scheme for 
 
66 Banat, supra note 41, at 949. 
67 World Diamond Council, About WDC, http://www.worlddiamond 
council.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2008). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (2001) 
[hereinafter Resolution 55/56].  See also United Nations Department of Public 
Information, supra note 7 (discussing the conflict diamonds controversy and 
briefly addressing conflict diamond issues in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia). 
71 Resolution 55/56, supra note 70, at 2. 
72 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 56/263, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/263 (2002) (urging, among other things, “the finalization of the 
international certification scheme and its subsequent implementation as soon as 
possible”). 
73 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 587. 
74  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 2. 
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the import and export of rough diamonds with the goal of 
preventing trade in conflict diamonds while protecting the 
legitimate diamond trade.75  As succinctly described by one 
commentator, the KPCS has three main elements: “a system of 
internal controls from the mine to the point of export; requirements 
for shipping rough diamonds; and a system to track the movement 
of rough diamonds after the point of export.”76  As of September 
2007, the KP had 48 participants representing 74 countries, with all 
European Community countries counted as a single participant.77  
The KP thus applies to more than 99% of global rough diamond 
production.78 
 Although the meetings that engendered the KPCS lacked the 
benefit of formal or diplomatic status and the agreement does not 
constitute a treaty, the Kimberley Process accords resembled any 
ordinary legislative process;79  in addition, the U.N.’s backing of 
the KP serves to buttress its international legitimacy.80  However, 
while some commentators have argued that the KPCS should be 
viewed as legally binding,81 many others describe the scheme as a 
mere political agreement that technically lacks “the binding force 
of international law” and thus neglects to provide a framework for 
legal means of enforcing the failings of participants.82  KP 
participants83 are required84 to pass national laws implementing 
 
75 KPCS, supra note 2. 
76 Kaplan, supra note 3, at 587. 
77 Kimberley Process, What is the Kimberley Process?, http://www 
.kimberleyprocess.com/index.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
78 Kimberley Process, Background, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
/background/index_en.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
79 Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the 
Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 835, 836 (2003). 
80 Woody, supra note 12, at 345. 
81 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 77, at 836 (arguing that “the agreement has 
the force of law”). 
82 See Price, supra note 15, at 66 (“Without a legally binding treaty, complete 
with a monitoring and enforcement mechanism, the KP may be no more binding 
than a nod and a handshake.”). 
83 The KPCS defines “participant” as “a state or a regional economic 
integration organisation for which the Certification Scheme is effective.”  KPCS, 
supra note 2, § 1. 
84 The term “required” (along with other similarly obligatory-sounding 
language) must be interpreted loosely in this context, in light of the fact that the 
KPCS only provides for what participants “should” do.  See KPCS, supra note 2, §§ 
2–5 (describing in detail what participants “should” do to comply with the KPCS).  
Indeed, as explained by Wallis, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has 
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import and export control regimes, which must entail the use of KP 
certificates to accompany all shipments of rough diamonds both 
leaving and entering their respective countries.85  In theory, this 
should prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate 
“diamond pipeline.”86  In practice, however, the KPCS’ lack of an 
international monitoring body or legally binding compliance 
standards has proved a serious weakness.87 
The KPCS prohibits participants from trading in rough 
diamonds with non-participants.88  Since the category of non-
participants encompasses some members of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), the KPCS restricts some trade between 
WTO members and thus violates certain articles of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) treaty.89  However, in 
May 2003, the WTO granted a waiver on trade restrictions so as to 
proscribe the exportation of rough diamonds to non-participants in 
the KP.90  In the past, the waiver was reviewed annually; in 
December 2006, the WTO extended the waiver for six years.91   
 
expressed concerns “stemming from [the KPCS’] ethos of voluntary participation 
and self-governance.”  Wallis, supra note 65, at 403.  One such concern relates to 
the fact that “adoption of the Scheme’s recommended internal controls is entirely 
optional and the expectation is that each participant will create appropriate 
internal controls voluntarily at the national level.”  Id. 
85 See id. § 2–4.  See also Woody, supra note 12, at 345 (describing the scheme). 
86 “Diamond pipeline” is generally defined as the “flow of diamonds from 
mine to consumer.”  Significant Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict 
Diamonds: Hearing on Illicit Diamonds, Conflict and Terrorism: Hearing on the Role of 
U.S. Agencies in Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring and the Dist. of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Gov’t 
Affairs,  107th Cong. 7 (2002) (testimony of Loren Yager, Dir., Int’l Affairs and 
Trade, U.S. GAO), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02425t.pdf.  Cf. 
Frans Schram, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 5 (Didier Verbruggen 
ed., International Peace Information Service 2007) (explaining that the control 
regimes embodied in the KPCS are designed to “keep conflict diamonds out of the 
legitimate ‘diamond pipeline.’”). 
87 Woody, supra note 12, at 345–46.  See infra notes 169–70 and accompanying 
text (describing this problematic dimension of the KPCS with respect to the 
Republic of Congo). 
88 KPCS, supra note 2, § 3 (“Each Participant should . . . (c) ensure that no 
shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-Participant.”).  
See infra note 143 and accompanying text, where this element of the KPCS is 
described in greater detail. 
89 Woody, supra note 12, at 336.  Article XI of the GATT bars WTO members 
from restricting trade to other members.  General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
90 Woody, supra note 12, at 336. 
91 Id. 
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3. THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND THE ILLICIT DIAMOND TRADE 
3.1. The Republic of Congo: Background Information 
The Republic of Congo, also known as Congo-Brazzaville, is a 
former French colony located in western central Africa.  After 
being granted formal independence from France in 1960, the ROC 
experimented with a Marxist form of government for more than 
two decades.92  As a result of gradual moderation of Congolese 
economic and political views, the ROC completed a transition to 
multi-party democracy in 1992.93  The nation’s democratic progress 
was frustrated in 1997, however, when civil war broke out and 
restored former Marxist president Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who was 
in power from approximately 1979 through 1992.94 
Prior to the war’s inception in 1997, the ROC’s system of 
government was comparable to that of the French.95  After seizing 
control, however, Sassou-Nguesso discontinued the 1992 
constitution upon which this system was based.96  A new 
constitution was approved in 2002—shortly before Sassou-
Nguesso won a largely boycotted presidential election97—which 
provides for a seven-year presidential term and a parliament of 
two houses, members of which serve for five years.98  This system 
vests most of the decisionmaking authority directly in the 
president and his administration.99  In 2007, General Emmanuel 
Ngouelondele, a former head of the special services unit of police 
intelligence, commented that the ROC’s authoritarian regime has 
weakened the people to such an extent that they have lost the will 
to resist, and that citizens “have been starved, humiliated, and 
 
92 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 3. 
93 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2008) [hereinafter ROC BACKGROUND NOTE], available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2825.htm. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Karanta Kalley, Sustained High Oil Prices Drive Global Insight to Revise 
Congo’s Sovereign Risk Rating, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Nov. 16, 2006. 
98 Id. 
99 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPUBLIC OF CONGO HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2004) , 
available at  http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41598.htm. 
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disregarded.”100  Ngouelondele also stated that “corruption is the 
[nation’s] system of governance,” whereby giving a bit of money to 
the people serves to assuage popular criticism.101 
The ROC has been described as “one of the poorest nations on 
earth” and is among the world’s least developed countries.102  As 
of August 2007, roughly 34% of the nation’s population103 was 
living below the poverty line, the per capita gross domestic 
product stood at $950, and the country ranked 140 out of 177 on 
the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human 
Development Index.104  An estimated 70% of the population lives 
on less than $1 per day.105 
By 2006, the country’s total external debt stock stood at over 
$5.5 billion, amounting to 123% of the gross domestic product 
(“GDP”).106  As explained by one commentator, “[m]ore important 
than the sheer volume of this crippling debt is the profile of its 
creditors.”107  More than one-third of the ROC’s nominal external 
debt stock is held by commercial creditors, in contrast to the debt 
of most neighboring nations; the amount of commercial debt in the 
country’s debt stock poses significant risk of default, “particularly 
given the heavy reliance on export revenue from a narrow basket 
of commodities.”108  The ROC’s economy is based primarily on the 
petroleum sector, which accounts for 89% of the nation’s export 
earnings.109  Other sources of export earnings include lumber, 
 
100 Franz Wild, Congo Elections Set to Start Amid Fraud Claims, VOA NEWS, 
June 24, 2007, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-
06/2007-06-24-voa2.cfm?textmode=0. 
101 Id. 
102 Alan Beattie, Vultures Unlikely Allies in Anti-Graft Cause, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 18, 2007, at 6; see also Dietrich, supra note 4, at 1 (describing central 
Africa’s diamond exporters, including the ROC, as some of the “least developed 
countries in the world”). 
103 As of July 2007, the population of the Republic of Congo was estimated at 
3,800,610.  ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93. 
104 World Health Org. (WHO), Health Action in Crises: Republic of the Congo 
(Aug. 2007) [hereinafter WHO on ROC], available at http://www.who.int/hac 
/crises/cog/roc_aug2007.pdf.  The higher the number of a country’s rank on the 
UNDP Human Development Index, the less developed the country is.  Id. at 1. 
105 Tony Allen-Mills, Congo Ruler Runs Up £207,000 Hotel Bill, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Jan. 7, 2007, at 27. 
106 Kalley, supra note 97. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93. 
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plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and diamonds.110  Short-term 
instability of commodity prices and the consequent variability of 
export earnings is, according to the WTO, “a major obstacle to 
sustained development,”111 as instability of export earnings may 
appreciably reduce economic welfare.112  Of the world’s least 
developed countries (“LDCs”) and even those nations with the 
most concentrated economies, the ROC ranks near the very top on 
an export earning variability index.113 
3.2. The Republic of Congo’s Suspect Exporting Activities and 
Ultimate Expulsion from the KP 
The Republic of Congo has an extensive history of suspicious 
trading in diamonds.  Most of the diamonds smuggled through the 
ROC come from the DRC; diamond trade between these nations 
has been occurring for approximately three-quarters of a century, 
with diamond counters set up in Brazzaville—the ROC’s capital—
in the 1930s to export stones (both smuggled and legitimate) to 
Europe.114  The DRC’s smuggling problem gained momentum in 
the 1980s, and the ROC played a key role in effectuating the 
trend.115  Due to the geographical proximity116 of and well-
established trade routes between the two countries, as well as the 
ROC’s lenient diamond regulations and lower export tax, the 
DRC’s neighbor was an attractive destination for smugglers and 
corrupt international diamond dealers alike.117 
 
110 Id. 
111 Economic Research and Statistics Division, The Role of Export Taxes in the 
Field of Primary Commodities 9 (2004) [hereinafter WTO Report] (prepared by 
Roberta Piermartini). 
112 Id.  Variable export earnings may decrease economic welfare in a number 
of ways, including: disruption of investment planning decisions, misallocation of 
resources, and adversely affecting growth; generating balance of payment 
problems, which may result in a high degree of external debt (as found in the 
ROC); and negatively impacting public finances.  Id. at 9–10. 
113 Id. 
114 See e.g., Congo-Brazzaville: Coming Cleaner, 45 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL 15, 6 
(2004) [hereinafter Coming Cleaner] (discussing the history of the diamond trade 
between the ROC and the DRC). 
115 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 5. 
116 The ports of Brazzaville and Kinshasa—the capital of the DRC—are 
separated by only five kilometers.  Ports and Shipping: Congo-DR Congo, 42 AFR. 
RES. BULL. 16743, 16761 (2005). 
117 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 16; Malamut, supra note 4, at 33. 
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In September 2000, International Diamond Industries (“IDI”), 
an Israeli firm, was awarded an eighteen-month monopoly on 
diamond exports from the DRC.118  Although questionable and 
contradictory statistics obscure the precise extent of the decline, 
diamond exports from the DRC dropped immediately.119  As soon 
as the IDI monopoly went into effect, there was a 50% drop in 
diamond imports to Belgium from the DRC and a striking upsurge 
in such imports from the ROC, which has only minimal diamond 
production of its own.120  Even after the IDI monopoly was 
annulled in April 2001 and Belgian diamond imports from the 
DRC increased, such imports from the ROC continued to rise.121  
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
One partial explanation is the typical seasonal increase in 
alluvial122 production when the rainy season subsides in southern 
DRC in April.123  Another viable explanation is that smuggling 
from the DRC persisted in spite of the IDI monopoly coming to an 
end.124  Other potential sources of the ROC’s increased diamond 
exports include Angola and Liberia.125  The ROC served as an 
outlet for UNITA diamonds when the rebels still controlled 
industrial mining sites in northeastern Angola prior to 1998, which 
is indicated in part by Belgian rough diamond imports from the 
ROC worth over $1 billion between 1995 and 1996.126  Angolan 
 
118 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 15. 
119 Id. 
120 Id.  See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
121 Id. at 16. 
122 “Alluvial [is] [t]he name of a type of diamond and the type of shallow 
mine it is extracted from, with diamonds found in river beds and in shallow 
deposits.”  A ROUGH TRADE, supra note 24, at 15. 
123 See Dietrich, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that “[o]ne partial explanation is 
the normal seasonal increase in alluvial production once the rains subside in 
April”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND 
NOTE: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2008) [hereinafter DRC BACKGROUND 
NOTE] (explaining that the DRC is situated on the Equator, with one-third of the 
country to the north and two-thirds to the south; south of the Equator, the rainy 
season occurs from October to May, as compared to the April through November 
rainy season in the north), available at http://www.state.gov 
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). 
124 See Dietrich, supra note 4, at 16 (“The most likely explanation is that the 
DRC traders simply continued to smuggle diamonds through Brazzaville, fearful 
that the flip-flop in laws, ministers and even governments in Kinshasa could 
backfire on their local activities again.”). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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diamonds from certain sources are often declared in Belgium as 
having come from the ROC, and smuggling of Angolan diamonds 
rose in 2001, with the ROC and the DRC as probable conduits.127  
Furthermore, throughout the 1990s, Liberia was a critical outlet for 
conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone and for illicit diamonds 
originating elsewhere.128  When a UNSC ban on Liberian diamonds 
took effect in May 2001,129 Belgian imports from Liberia trickled 
off, while imports from the ROC doubled.130 
Despite unreliable, confusing, and sometimes even nonexistent 
statistics profiling the international diamond trade, the inescapable 
conclusion is that the Republic of Congo had become “a major hub 
for the trafficking of illicit and conflict diamonds.”131  Nevertheless, 
the nation was admitted to the Kimberley Process in 2003.  At the 
time, the focus was on whether criteria were met on paper, as 
opposed to in practice, and the ROC had passed regulations 
calculated to achieve the minimum conditions required by the 
scheme.132  However, in response to concerns that the nation’s 
rough diamond exports far surpassed its geological production 
capacity,133 as well as suspicions relating to the fact that the 
country was only charging a 2% export tax on diamonds, in 
contrast to the more typical 3% elsewhere in the region, the KP 
dispatched a review mission to the ROC in 2004.134 
Headed by former KP Chairman Abbey Chikane of South 
Africa, who was joined by experts from Canada, Israel, the WDC, 
and the Ottowa-based NGO Partnership Africa-Canada, the review 
mission spent May 31 through June 4 of 2004 investigating in the 
ROC.135  According to a report subsequently submitted by the 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 S.C. Res. 1343, supra note 51. 
130 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 16.  See also Malamut, supra note 4, at 33 (“It was 
not until after the U.N. sanctions went into effect against Liberia in 2001 . . . that 
the ROC became the primary exporter of smuggled Central African conflict 
diamonds.”). 
131 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 17. 
132 Wallis, supra note 65, at 408. 
133 Id.  See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
134 Wolf-Christian Paes, “Conflict Diamonds” to “Clean Diamonds”: The 
Development of the Kimberley Process Scheme, in RESOURCE POLITICS IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 318 (Matthias Basedau & Andreas Mehler eds., 2005) [hereinafter RESOURCE 
POLITICS]. 
135 News Release, Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Removes the 
Republic of Congo from the List of Participants (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter KP Press 
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review mission, ROC authorities were unable to account for a 
“massive discrepancy” between the magnitude of rough diamond 
exports and the lack of any reported production or imports.136  
While its estimated production capacity hovered at only 55,000 
carats per year,137 the ROC’s reported diamond exports totaled 
approximately 5.2 million carats per year—thus, exports exceeded 
production by over 9000%.138 
Investigators reported that ROC officials trafficked the stones 
through the secondary diamond centers of Switzerland and the 
United Arab Emirates to skirt more exacting controls at the world’s 
diamond hub, Antwerp, Belgium.139  According to investigators, 
these officials also significantly undervalued the stones upon 
formally declaring them in Switzerland; in order to avoid paying 
taxes and withhold revenues, they declared uncut, unset gem-
quality stones at, on average, a scant 1.3% of the market price 
which they would ordinarily command—$0.98 per carat, in 
contrast to the average market price of $75.90 per carat.140  Such 
findings begged the conclusion that the ROC lacked adequate 
controls to ensure that Kimberley Process certificates were only 
issued for rough diamonds mined in or legitimately imported into 
the country.141  Accordingly, the nation was expelled from the KP 
in July 2004.142 
3.3. Consequences of Expulsion for the Republic of Congo 
As mentioned briefly in the context of the WTO waiver 
described in Section 2.3,143 a key aspect of the Kimberley Process is 
that participants may only trade rough diamonds with other 
 
Release], available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/media/news_archives 
_en.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
136 Id. 
137 Christian Tsoumou, Experts Examine Congo’s Efforts to Stop Blood Diamonds, 
REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk 
/L05885891.htm. 
138 Daniel Balint-Kurti, Congo Suspended from World Diamond Trade, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org 
/security/issues/diamond/2004/0710congsusp.htm. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 KP Press Release, supra note 135, at 1. 
142 Id. 
143 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the prohibition on 
trade in rough diamonds between participants and non-participants in the KP). 
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participants that have complied with the minimum obligations of 
the KPCS.144  Thus, by its removal from the KP, the Republic of 
Congo lost its ability to trade rough diamonds with dozens of 
nations, including Belgium—the international center of the 
diamond trade—and the U.S., which purchases two-thirds of the 
world’s diamonds.145  Since it was thereby precluded from trading 
rough diamonds with legitimate channels representing at least 98% 
of the world diamond trade,146 expulsion likely led to the loss of 
legitimate revenues for the ROC. 
In addition to revenues lost as a direct result of the country’s 
inability to trade rough diamonds with almost the entire diamond-
trading community, the ROC may experience—if it has not 
already—further losses in revenue as a consequence of expulsion-
related harm to its reputation.  As one commentator has noted, 
“[t]he international diamond trade is operated by a close-knit and 
consolidated industry that. . . has special interests in avoiding a 
blemish on a product which it markets as a symbol of love.”147  
Both the ROC’s history of trading in conflict and illicit diamonds 
and its expulsion from the KP have been highly publicized.148  
Thus, industry players might be reluctant to deal with the ROC for 
even those diamond-related transactions that are not proscribed, 
such as trade in polished diamonds,149 which could cause 
additional revenue loss.  Because diamonds are not among the 
ROC’s prevailing resources, however, potential legitimate 
revenues forgone as a result of the country’s expulsion from the KP 
would likely not be of dire significance.  Nevertheless, some 
 
144 KPCS, supra note 2, § 3. 
145 Balint-Kurti, supra note 138. 
146 At the time of the ROC’s expulsion on July 9, 2004, the Kimberley Process 
had 43 participants, with the European Community counting as a single 
participant.  KP Press Release, supra note 135, at 5.  This represented roughly 98% 
of the world diamond trade.  See Balint-Kurti, supra note 138 (discussing the 
ROC’s expulsion from the KP and the legitimate world diamond trade).  As of 
September 2007, the KP had 48 participants, representing 74 countries and 
accounting for over 99% of the world diamond trade.  See supra notes 86–87 and 
accompanying text (examining obstacles to eradicating the illicit world diamond 
trade). 
147 SCHRAM, supra note 86, at 37. 
148  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 6. 
149 See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text (explaining the legality of 
trade in polished stones between participants and non-participants). 
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diamond production does exist,150 and in a nation where the 
majority of the population has minimal purchasing power and 
little access to adequate food and healthcare,151 such lost revenues 
are not without consequence for the citizens of the ROC.   
Aside from potential losses in legitimate revenues, the Republic 
of Congo has suffered few, if any, consequences related to its illicit 
trade in diamonds and resultant expulsion from the KP.  In fact, 
although its legal trade in rough diamonds largely ceased, there is 
evidence that the ROC’s illegal trade in rough diamonds has 
continued post-expulsion.  According to Global Witness, analysis 
of the United Nations’ Commodity Trade Statistics (“Comtrade”) 
Database indicates that from 2004 to 2006, illegal trade in rough 
diamonds worth at least $10.2 million transpired between KP 
participant and non-participant countries.152  As this figure 
excludes smuggled diamonds, trade that was not officially 
declared by the importer or exporter, and trade in countries that 
did not report the relevant data to the U.N.,153 it is anticipated to be 
appreciably lower than the aggregate illegal trade that actually 
took place.154  Analysis of the data further indicates that exchanges 
with the ROC accounted for the bulk of illicit trade, with a number 
of participant countries reporting trade in rough diamonds with 
the non-participant country in 2005 and 2006, for a total of close to 
$8.3 million.155  These participant countries include the United 
States, India, South Africa, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, 
among others.156 
 
150 See Mexivada Begins Work Program on Congo Coloured Diamonds Project, 
CAN. NEWS WIRE, Nov. 20, 2006 (discussing current excavation programs in the 
ROC, which have yielded “diamonds to sizes in excess of 1 carat . . . including 
colored diamonds”); see, e.g., Mexivada Subsidiary Awarded Three Additional 
Exclusive Diamond Concessions in Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), PR NEWSWIRE US, 
Oct. 24, 2006 (noting that “significant quantities” of diamonds were produced in 
regions located within concession areas awarded to Mexivada.’s subsidiary in the 
ROC). 
151 WHO on ROC, supra note 104, at 2.  The mortality rate for children under 
age 5 in the ROC is over 10%, and more than half of the country’s population 
lacks access to safe drinking water.  Id. 
152  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 1. 
153 See infra text accompanying notes 158, 159 (describing the difficulties 
inherent in sustaining a legitimate international diamond trade). 
154  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 6. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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As duly recognized by Global Witness, however, the 
underlying data is not without limitations.157  The U.N. Comtrade 
Database comprises official statistics submitted to the U.N. by each 
nation that decides to report on its trade figures.158  Since many 
countries either do not keep or do not report thorough information 
on international trade, the data is not comprehensive. 
Nevertheless, in spite of such imperfections, Comtrade data does 
represent officially reported trade statistics and is used extensively 
as a definitive source for international trade figures.159 
Apart from the Comtrade data, the Kimberley Process also 
amasses and evaluates statistical data pertaining to the production 
and trade of rough diamonds.160  In order to maintain compliance 
with the terms of the KPCS, participants must submit data relating 
to their trade in rough diamonds on a quarterly basis and on their 
production of rough diamonds on a semi-annual basis.161  Like the 
Comtrade data, the KP data has its inadequacies—it only covers 
trade between participating countries and thus fails to expose 
leakages in the system; also, the data only pertains to rough 
diamonds (to the exclusion of polished stones).162  In addition, 
“[s]everal participant countries either submit their statistics late or 
not at all, without penalty, despite the fact that statistical reporting 
is a fundamental element of Kimberley Process membership and 
compliance.”163  But while both of these pools of information leave 
something to be desired in terms of comprehensiveness and 
unfailing accuracy, they constitute the most complete collection of 
statistics relevant to the international diamond trade and overall 
success of the KPCS, and are thus of considerable value.  
Regardless of the precise dimensions of the illegal trade suggested 
by the figures, it is clear that transactions involving the Republic of 
Congo accounted for the vast majority of it. 
 
157 “Bad statistics, false statistics, and no statistics at all have plagued the 
diamond industry for years.”  Dietrich, supra note 4, at 17.  See also supra note 131 
and accompanying text (explaining the unreliability of present diamond trading 
statistics). 
158  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 4. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Wallis, supra note 65, at 407. 
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Exclusive of the ROC’s contributions to the illegal trade of 
rough diamonds, the U.N. Comtrade figures implicate the nation 
in the illicit trade of polished stones as well.  The KPCS controls 
only trade in rough diamonds,164 and therefore, as implied 
above,165 the legality of the ROC’s trade in polished diamonds was 
not affected by its expulsion from the certification scheme.  Despite 
its continued propriety, the occurrence and extent of the nation’s 
post-expulsion trade in polished diamonds has raised eyebrows. 
This is to be expected, given the country’s geological production 
capacity and history of illicit trade, among other things. 
As analyzed by Global Witness, the U.N. Comtrade data 
indicates that from 2005 to 2006 the Republic of Congo exported 
more than $650,000 worth of polished diamonds to the United 
States.166  Since the ROC does have some diamond production of its 
own,167 domestic polishing factories could have legally purchased 
domestically-produced diamonds168 and then legally exported 
them to the U.S.  As the ROC lacks effective procedures to control 
its trade in rough diamonds, however, there would be no means of 
ensuring that the rough stones had not been illegally smuggled 
into the country.169  After all, a nation with a consistent history of 
government involvement in illicit trade of diamonds can hardly be 
expected to domestically enforce such violations of relevant local 
law.170  Smuggled rough diamonds could also be deliberately 
misclassified and exported as polished diamonds, which would 
not be checked for a KP certificate.171  It is worthy of note that once 
 
164 See generally KPCS, supra note 2 §§ 1–4 (detailing the responsibilities, with 
regards to diamond trading, of participants in the KP). 
165 See supra note 149 (describing the effects of participation and non-
participation in the KP on the legality of trade in polished diamonds). 
166 See LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 13 (indicating 
that from 2005–2006 the U.S. imported $665,490 worth of polished diamonds from 
the Republic of Congo). 
167 See supra note 150 (detailing the Mexivada Mining Corporation’s 
involvement in diamond production initiatives within the ROC). 
168  LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 9. 
169 Id.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining the ROC’s 
removal from the KP). 
170 Cf. Woody, supra note 12, at 346 (explaining the problem of the KPCS’ lack 
of international monitoring: “The extent of any monitoring lies within the realm of 
domestic enforcement for any violation of domestic legislation.  However, this 
enforcement could be sporadic at best, and entirely at the discretion of the 
participating country.”) (emphasis added). 
171 Id. 
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diamonds are polished, it is nearly impossible to ascertain their 
source.172  This situation illustrates just one of the weaknesses of 
the KPCS. 
3.4. Effects of the Republic of Congo’s Illicit Trade in Diamonds on 
Neighboring Nations 
As noted by one commentator, “a direct effect of the illegal 
diamond trade and mineral exploitation is that the producing 
countries, overrun by rebel groups, lose millions in possible 
revenue for the country.”173  Such lost revenues serve to perpetuate 
the cycle of war and conflict, further injuring already dilapidated 
infrastructure and thus reducing the capacity of nations to deal 
with domestic and international conflicts.174  In addition, such 
revenues are desperately needed to fund healthcare initiatives and 
other social welfare programs in producing nations.175  “Peace and 
the protection of the legal diamond trade are vital to the social and 
economic welfare of those diamond-rich but impoverished and 
politically fragile African countries.”176 
One such country is the Democratic Republic of Congo.  At a 
minimum,177 official diamond exports constitute approximately 
one-third of the total foreign currency generated by the DRC’s 
trade balance and from 1995 through 2000, brought in an 
approximate total of slightly over $2 billion.178  However, the 
potential but unrealized gains far exceed this figure.  Smuggled 
diamonds divest the DRC diamond trade’s formal sector of foreign 
currency and the government of legitimate revenue.179  As a result 
of diamonds being smuggled out of the country, the DRC’s 
potential GDP is robbed of approximately $854 million per year.180  
 
172 See Price, supra note 15, at 26 (“Experienced diamond traders can 
determine the origin of uncut stones, but once rough diamonds are polished, it is 
virtually impossible to determine their true source.”). 
173 Woody, supra note 12, at 339. 
174 Id. at 340. 
175 See, e.g., infra note 185 and accompanying text (stating that failing 
infrastructure has weakened the DRC’s healthcare system). 
176 Price, supra note 15, at 26–27. 
177 In 2003, diamonds accounted for more than half of the DRC’s official 
exports, worth approximately $642 million.  DRC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 
123. 
178 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 13. 
179 Id. 
180 Woody, supra note 12, at 340. 
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Most of the diamonds smuggled through the Republic of Congo 
come from its neighbor, the DRC.181 
The DRC cannot afford such losses.  The country ranks 167 out 
of 177 on the UNDP Human Development Index scale, and 80 out 
of 102 on the Human Poverty Index.182  As of 2006, the DRC’s 
external debt stood at a staggering $10 billion and the per capita 
GDP was a mere $300 in 2007.183  “An estimated 1,200 people die 
each day as a result of conflict-related causes such as poverty, 
preventable diseases, and gender-based violence.”184  “Conflict and 
collapsed infrastructure” have “severely weakened” the DRC’s 
health system—in many parts of the country, the system 
“functions as if it were private and patients cannot afford to seek 
assistance.”185  
4.  PRINCIPAL SUGGESTION FOR CHANGE:  RAISING THE REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO’S EXPORT TAX ON DIAMONDS 
The KPCS has not succeeded at keeping all illicit rough 
diamonds out of legitimate channels of trade.  The Republic of 
Congo, in particular, has managed to evade KPCS controls and 
continue to serve as a hub for the smuggling of conflict and illicit 
diamonds, as it has for the greater part of the past century.186  
Despite such indiscretions, the ROC was readmitted to the 
Kimberley Process in November 2007.187  According to Karel 
 
181 Coming Cleaner, supra note 114, at 6. 
182 World Health Org. [WHO], Health Action in Crises: Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (July 2007), available at http://www.who.int/hac/crises/cod 
/background/DRCongo_July07.pdf [hereinafter WHO on DRC].  See supra note 
104 (reporting that the ROC ranks 140 out of 177 on the UNDP Human 
Development Index scale, and as of 2005, 51 out of 102 on the Human Poverty 
Index). 
183 DRC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 123. 
184 WHO on DRC, supra note 182, at 1.  One commentator refers to the eastern 
part of the DRC as “[t]he rape capital of the world,” explaining that “in some 
areas, three-quarters of women have been raped.”  Nicholas D. Kristof, The 
Weapon of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at 14. 
185 WHO on DRC, supra note 182, at 1. 
186 See Coming Cleaner, supra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the 
smuggling which has occurred in the ROC for roughly seventy-five years); notes 
131–42 and accompanying text (explaining the ROC’s illicit trade in diamonds 
prior to the country’s expulsion from the KP); notes 152–56 and accompanying 
text (describing the ROC’s continued illicit trade in rough diamonds with 
participant countries subsequent to its expulsion from the KP). 
187 2007 KP Communiqué, supra note 6, at 1. 
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Kovanda, chairperson of the KP secretariat, the country’s 
readmission was the result of its “very serious domestic effort to 
put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the 
level required.”188  Beyond this vague justification, scant 
information has been released concerning concrete changes made 
or other explanations relevant to the ROC’s readmission.189 
Given the Republic of Congo’s extensive history of illicit trade 
in diamonds and the KP’s demonstrated inability to curb the 
occurrence of such trade, the severity of the humanitarian and 
economic crises plaguing the ROC and neighboring resource-rich 
nations, and the extent to which corruption compromises the 
integrity of the ROC government,190 the country’s readmission to 
the KP alone will not likely thwart its trade in conflict and illicit 
diamonds.191  Instead, as a means of demonstrating its commitment 
to keeping illicitly traded diamonds out of legitimate channels of 
trade and restoring expropriated and much-needed revenues to the 
government and citizens in a transparent way, the ROC should 
raise its export tax on diamonds. 
The ROC’s export tax192 on diamonds is appreciably lower than 
that of its resource-rich neighbors, which is one generally accepted 
rationale for the country’s position as a hub for smuggling.193  
 
188 Michael Deibert, Trade: Blood Diamonds No Longer Congo-Brazzaville’s Best 
Friend, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 30, 2007, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp 
?idnews=40296. 
189 See, e.g., 2007 KP Communiqué, supra note 6, at 2 (declaring that 
“[p]lenary approved the re-admission of the Republic of Congo to the Kimberley 
Process,” without providing further information); see also ROC BACKGROUND 
NOTE, supra note 93 (stating solely that “[i]n November 2007, Congo was 
readmitted to the Kimberley Process, an international multi-stakeholder initiative 
designed to stem the trade of conflict diamonds”). 
190 See infra Sections 5.1, 5.2 (explaining that wealth in natural resources 
coupled with deficient governmental transparency typically leads to 
governmental corruption). 
191 This is especially true in light of the fact that the KPCS lacks the 
framework for a system of international monitoring or legally binding 
enforcement of violations.  See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
192 Within the ROC’s export regime, the measure directly related to diamonds 
is in fact technically a royalty.  International Monetary Fund [IMF], Country Report 
No. 07/206, Republic of Congo: Selected Issues 90 (2007) [hereinafter IMF Country 
Report].  However, the relevant royalty is almost universally described by 
commentators as an export tax and in practical operation has comparable, if not 
identical, effects on the volume of diamonds exported from the ROC. 
193 See Dietrich, supra note 4, at 16 (“Diamond regulations in Congo-
Brazzaville are lax, and taxes are low, major attractions for corrupt international 
diamond dealers positioning themselves along African smuggling routes.”); see 
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Lower export taxes serve as an incentive to import or otherwise 
bring smuggled rough diamonds into the ROC and export them, 
more cheaply, under the guise of the stones having been mined 
domestically.194  In stark contrast to Angola, which imposes an 
export tax on diamonds of up to 11% of their value, and the DRC, 
with a 3.75% tax,195 the Republic of Congo’s export tax on 
diamonds lags at a mere 2%.196 
The significant disparity between the DRC’s export tax on 
diamonds and that of Angola may be explained by the fact that 
unlike the DRC, Angola does not depend on diamond exports to 
maintain state revenue.197  Despite the plentiful presence of 
diamonds in Angola, Angolan exports are dominated by 
petroleum and derivatives; in 2006, petroleum and derivatives 
accounted for 94% of exports, whereas diamonds accounted for 
just 3.5%.198  In contrast, diamonds accounted for more than half of 
the total value of exports in the DRC in 2003.199 
Unlike the DRC, the Republic of Congo does not rely on 
diamond exports to maintain state revenue.  In fact, petroleum 
accounted for an estimated 89% of the nation’s export earnings in 
2006, with forestry coming in second and generating just under 
7%.200  The ROC’s lack of reliance on diamond exports to maintain 
legitimate state revenue supports the conclusion that raising the 
country’s export tax on diamonds to a level commensurate with 
that of similarly situated nations, such as Angola, will not 
significantly affect its economy.  What raising the export tax will do 
is serve as a disincentive for corrupt officials and other potential 
 
also, GLOBAL WITNESS, REFORMING THE DRC DIAMOND SECTOR 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/153/en/reforming_th
e_drc_diamond_sector (recommending that governments of neighboring 
diamond-producing countries including the DRC, ROC, and Angola work “to 
achieve tax harmonization to reduce incentives for smuggling”) [hereinafter 
REFORMING DRC DIAMOND SECTOR]. 
194 Malamut, supra note 4, at 28. 
195  REFORMING DRC DIAMOND SECTOR, supra note 193, at 2. 
196 IMF Country Report, supra note 192, at 90.  RESOURCE POLITICS, supra note 
134, at 318. 
197 Dietrich, supra note 4, at 24. 
198 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
ANGOLA (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/a/98885.htm 
[hereinafter ANGOLA BACKGROUND NOTE]. 
199 DRC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 123. 
200 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93. 
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smugglers to bring rough diamonds—conflict or illicit—into the 
ROC with the intent to export them out at a higher profit. 
All export taxes reduce the volume of exports and thus operate 
as a form of export restriction.201  According to the WTO, “[i]t is 
generally argued that export taxes are the preferred instrument 
among the various policy options to restrict exports.  Taxes are a 
credible policy, yielding the government some revenue while being 
transparent and simple to administer.”202  From an economic 
standpoint, raising the ROC’s export tax on diamonds will have 
nominal—if any—adverse consequences for consumers, both 
foreign and domestic.  As explained by the WTO, if a country 
imposing an export tax is a “small” country, meaning that it 
represents only a small share of the world supply of the taxed 
commodity, changes in its volume of exports will not affect world 
price.203  Thus, foreign consumers will not bear any of the cost of an 
increased tax on diamonds exported from the ROC.204  With 
respect to domestic consumers, of which there are likely few, a tax 
on exports decreases the price of the taxed good.205  Accordingly, 
those domestic-diamond purchasing citizens of the ROC stand to 
gain from a higher export tax. 
The impact of an export tax also extends to the markets of 
substitutable and complementary goods, as well as “those of the 
goods backwards and forward in the production chain.”206  
Typically, an export tax on a commodity will have a negative 
impact on the sector producing a substitute good and a positive 
impact on those sectors producing complementary goods.207  The 
existence of the conflict diamond situation itself serves to 
demonstrate that there is no real substitute for a diamond, and 
thus no true cause for concern over the potential negative impact 
that raising the export tax on diamonds might have for sectors 
producing a substitute good.  Moreover, quasi-substitutes such as 
 
201 WTO Report, supra note 111, at 3. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 4. 
204 Id. at 6. 
205 Id. at 5. 
206 Id. 
207 Id.  Take, for example, the case of an export tax imposed on coffee.  
Because of the lower price, domestic purchasers will increase demand for coffee 
and reduce that for a substitute, such as tea.  While the tea industry stands to lose 
in such a situation, the coffee-maker machine industry will gain as demand for its 
products rises.  Id. 
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other rare gems are not produced in the Republic of Congo, so 
potential damage to such industries should not pose a concern 
either.  
Another factor weighing in favor of the ROC raising its export 
tax on diamonds pertains to ease of revenue collection.  According 
to the WTO, when the commodity produced and exported has a 
known international price, “export taxes can be more readily 
applied and are more transparent.”208  Diamonds command an 
easily verifiable and consistently high price across the globe; thus, 
provided uncorrupt customs agents are employed, valuation of 
whatever legitimate diamonds make their way through ROC 
customs should not present an issue.  In addition, as a WTO 
member, the ROC is bound to adhere to the terms of the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, which governs customs 
valuation.209  This further enhances the ease and transparency with 
which ROC customs valuation of diamonds and relevant revenue 
collection may occur. 
4.1. Possible Means of Exacting Compliance with a Request that the 
Republic of Congo Raise its Export Tax on Diamonds 
There are several potential approaches which might be used to 
persuade an otherwise unwilling Republic of Congo to raise its 
export tax on diamonds.  Initially, the threat of expulsion from the 
Kimberley Process might suffice to convince the ROC to increase 
the relevant export tax.  If the mere threat of expulsion is not 
enough, KP officials should, for the second time, expel the ROC 
from the KP. 
Another possibility is for the United States to impose economic 
sanctions.  At first glance, the U.S. seems appropriately situated to 
implement economic sanctions against the ROC for non-
compliance with a request to raise its export tax on diamonds.  
According to Hufbauer, a leading scholar on international trade 
and economic sanctions: 
 
208 Id. at 14. 
209 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in 
Goods, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs 
_e/legal_e/20-val.pdf. 
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‘Demonstration of resolve’ has often supplied the 
driving force behind the imposition of sanctions.  This 
is particularly true for the U.S., which frequently has 
deployed sanctions to assert its leadership in world 
affairs.  U.S. presidents seemingly feel compelled to 
dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds . . . .  Indeed, 
such action is often expected by the international 
community—to demonstrate moral outrage and to 
reassure the alliance that the United States will stand 
by its international commitments.  The impact of such 
moral and psychological factors on the decision to impose 
sanctions should not be underestimated, even if it is hard 
to document.210 
In conjunction with these observations, according to U.N. 
Comtrade data, trade between the U.S. and the ROC accounted for 
almost one-quarter of estimated worldwide illegal trade in rough 
diamonds in 2005.211  Given its reputation as a world leader and 
moral crusader, upon being presented with these figures, the U.S. 
would likely feel considerable pressure to act so as to combat the 
implication of immorality advanced by the statistics.  Encouraging 
the ROC to raise its export tax on diamonds seems to fit the bill for 
such a campaign against immorality.  Likewise, the ultimate 
imposition of economic sanctions on the ROC for non-compliance 
with such a request seemingly conveys an even stronger official 
stance against corruption. 
Moreover, economic sanctions appear to be most effective 
when directed toward “erstwhile friends and close trading 
partners.”212  As stated by Hufbauer, “[t]he higher compliance with 
 
210 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: 
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 11 (Peterson Institute 1990) (1985) (emphasis 
added). 
211 See LOOPHOLES IN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 5, at 11–12 (valuing 
reported trade in rough diamonds between the U.S. and the ROC in 2005 at 
$1,897,748—this accounts for more than 23% of the aggregate reported illegal 
trade in rough diamonds in 2005, which stands at $8,168,988).  With such trade, 
the U.S. violated not only its obligations under the KP, but also the United States 
Clean Diamond Trade Act.  As implemented in 2003, the Clean Diamond Trade 
Act prohibits “the importation into, or exportation from, the United States of any 
rough diamond, from whatever source, that has not been controlled through the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.”  Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 
3901-10 (2000). 
212 HUFBAUER, supra note 210, at 99. 
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sanctions by allies and trading partners reflects their willingness to 
bend on specific issues in deference to an overall relationship with 
the sender country.”213  The relationship between the U.S. and the 
ROC certainly may be considered friendly.  According to the U.S. 
Department of State, “[r]elations between the United States and the 
government of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso are strong, 
positive, and cooperative.”214 
Furthermore, Hufbauer proposes that economic sanctions more 
often succeed at achieving their underlying desired end(s) when 
“the target country conducts a large portion of its trade with the 
sender.”215  Referred to as “trade linkage,” this factor is measured 
by calculating “the average of: (1) the target country’s imports 
from the sender as a percentage of its total imports; and (2) the 
target country’s exports to the sender as a percentage of its total 
exports.”216  Hufbauer suggests that in the majority of situations 
involving modest policy goals, a category into which the goal of 
persuading the ROC to raise its export tax on diamonds falls, the 
trade linkage exceeds 20 percent.217  Trade estimates reveal that 
exports to the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of total ROC exports in 
2006, and that 7.1 percent of all ROC imports came from the U.S. in 
that same year.218  As the average of these two figures exceeds 20%, 
according to Hufbauer’s methodology, the ROC conducts a 
“significant portion” of its trade with the U.S. and thus sanctions 
sent by the latter nation have a greater likelihood of achieving their 
desired “modest policy goal.” 
In addition, Hufbauer suggests a “direct correlation between 
the political and economic health of the target country and its 
susceptibility to economic pressure,” noting that “countries in 
distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to 
succumb to the policy objectives of the sender country.”219  Given 
the “crippling” extent of the ROC’s debt,220 the plight of its 
 
213 Id. at 100. 
214 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93. 
215 HUFBAUER, supra note 210, at 85. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93.  Trade estimates valued ROC 
exports at $5.996 billion and imports at $1.964 billion for the year 2006.  Id. 
219 HUFBAUER, supra note 210, at 82, 83. 
220 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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impoverished citizens,221 and the endemic corruption in 
government,222 it would be difficult—if not impossible—to argue 
that the ROC is not highly susceptible to the economic pressure 
which would be created by the threat and/or ultimate imposition 
of sanctions by the U.S. 
Closer examination of the United States’ position, however, 
reveals at least one (temporarily) insurmountable obstacle standing 
in the way of effective implementation of economic sanctions 
targeted at the ROC.  This hurdle relates to the GATT treaty, 
which, with its primary purpose as the promotion of fair 
international trade, prohibits members of the WTO from 
implementing restrictions on trade with other members.223  There 
are, however, exceptions to this general prohibition, which are 
found in Articles XX and XXI of the GATT.224  For the purposes of 
this paper, the only relevant possible exceptions are embodied in 
Article XX.225 
The legality of exceptions under Article XX is analyzed as 
follows:  at the outset, the restriction at issue must be 
“provisionally justified under the applicable Article XX exception,” 
meaning that it must be “necessary” in accordance with at least 
one of a variety of enumerated sets of circumstances; in addition, 
the restriction must comply with the introductory clause of Article 
XX, referred to as the “chapeau.”226  An expression of the 
“international principle of good faith,” conformity with the 
chapeau demands that contracting parties “refrain from acts which 
 
221 See supra notes 102–13 and accompanying text (describing the depressed 
condition of the ROC). 
222 See supra notes 100–01, 139–40 and accompanying text (explaining the 
history of corruption in the ROC); see infra Section 5.2 (detailing the current 
pervasiveness of corruption within the ROC’s government). 
223 GATT, supra note 89, art. XI; Woody, supra note 12, at 347.  The U.S. has 
been a member of the WTO since January 1, 1995; similarly, the ROC has been a 
WTO member since March 27, 1997.  WTO, Understanding the WTO: Members and 
Observers, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e 
/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008). 
224 GATT, supra note 89, arts. XX, XXI. 
225 Article XXI is irrelevant because it pertains to exceptions for trade 
restrictions either adopted pursuant to national security concerns or in pursuit of 
compliance with the U.N. Charter. 
226 See Price, supra note 15, at 53 (describing the “two-tiered method for 
applying Article XX”). 
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would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”227  Compliance 
with the chapeau also requires that measures adopted do not 
“constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.”228 
With respect to the possibility of U.S. sanctions against the 
ROC for non-compliance with a request to raise its export tax on 
diamonds, the most plausible routes would be to pursue an 
exception under Article XX(a)—pertaining to restrictions 
“necessary to protect public morals”—and/or Article XX(d)—
relating to restrictions “necessary to secure compliance with laws 
or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement . . . and the prevention of deceptive practices.”229  
However, such exceptions are precluded by the fact that the U.S. 
and ROC have ratified a Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”).  The 
underlying object of the BIT, which entered into force on August 
13, 1994, is the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment in the U.S. and the ROC.230  Since compliance with  the 
Article XX chapeau bars the U.S. from enforcing against the ROC 
any trade restrictions “which would defeat the object and purpose” 
of a treaty, it therefore precludes all economic sanctions which 
would run counter to the purpose of the BIT—namely, to 
encourage and protect investment in the ROC.  This seemingly 
encompasses and thus rules out all potentially effective sanctions-
related options. 
However, one feasible means of breaking down this barrier in 
the relatively near future is a threat from the U.S. to terminate the 
BIT.  Article XIII of the U.S.-ROC BIT contains provisions for 
termination of the agreement.231  Section 2 of this Article provides 
that either party may, upon the end of the initial ten-year period 
(from the effective date of the BIT) or at any time thereafter, 
 
227 Id. at 54.  See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), Jan. 
27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
228 GATT, supra note 89, art. XX. 
229 Id. art. XX(a),(d). 
230 Treaty with the People’s Republic of the Congo Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-ROC, Feb. 12, 1990, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 102-1, available at http://www.state.gov./documents/organization 
/43545.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-ROC BIT]. 
231 Id. art. XIII. 
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terminate the agreement by giving one year’s notice to the other 
party.232  The mere threat of termination may be enough to 
persuade the ROC to raise its export tax on diamonds.233 
If, however, the threat of termination does not resonate with 
the ROC, the U.S. could submit written notice and wait one year 
for the termination to go into effect.  Section 3 of Article XIII 
stipulates that the provisions of all of the other Articles of the BIT 
will continue to be effective as to investments made or acquired 
prior to termination for ten years from the effective date of 
termination.234  Thus, upon termination, the U.S. would have 
several options with respect to the possible implementation of 
economic sanctions on the ROC.  These include, but are not limited 
to, sanctions: prohibiting future investment in the ROC; banning 
exports to the ROC (those not affecting investments made prior to 
termination of the BIT); banning imports from the ROC (again, 
those not affecting investments made prior to the BIT’s termination 
date); and prohibiting provision of other financial aid to the ROC.  
While France, the former colonial power, is currently the ROC’s 
“principal external partner, contributing significant amounts of 
economic assistance, while playing a highly influential role,” there 
is “growing interest in attracting American investors.”235  
Accordingly, a threat from the United States to terminate the BIT 
could likely convince the ROC to raise its export tax on diamonds 
(a measure which seemingly pales in comparison to the prospect of 
foregoing all future American investments).236 
 
232 Id. § 2. 
233 See Christine Carneiro, Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of International Law Symposium: Trade Sanctions in a 21st Century Economy: 
Are They an Appropriate or Effective Means of Altering State Behavior? (Feb. 29, 
2008) (transcript forthcoming, Biddle Library at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School) (explaining that a great deal of economic sanctions are not imposed 
because the mere threat of sanctions was alone sufficient to produce the desired 
results). 
234 U.S.-ROC BIT, supra note 230, art. XIII, § 3 (emphasis added). 
235 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93. 
236 Hufbauer’s research further supports this conclusion.  See supra text 
accompanying note 213 (“The higher compliance with sanctions by allies and 
trading partners reflects their willingness to bend on specific issues in deference 
to an overall relationship with the sender country.”). 
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5.  PROSPECTS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND NEIGHBORING 
RESOURCE-RICH NATIONS 
5.1. Implications of Plentiful Natural Resources 
As demonstrated by the situations in the ROC, the DRC, Sierra 
Leone, and Angola, among many other countries, a primary 
implication of plentiful natural resources is political repression and 
instability.237  This phenomenon is widely described as the 
“resource curse.”  While specific definitions of this concept vary 
depending on the commentator or organization describing it, the 
general idea is that the richer the nation with respect to natural 
resources, the poorer the quality of management and the greater 
the degree of political repression.238  An alternative but very much 
related formulation of the “resource curse” is that nations rich in 
mineral resources are plagued by extreme poverty and populations 
do not profit from the countries’ natural wealth.239  The ROC, like 
its diamond-rich neighbors, has been plagued by the “resource 
curse” on account of its wealth in petroleum.  In 2006, the nation 
“slipped from partly free to not-free status.”240 
Another implication of abundant natural resources is a lack of 
transparency in extractive industries.  A lack of transparency 
breeds ideal conditions for corruption,241 and the ROC ranks 
toward the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index.242  The utter absence of transparency in the 
nation’s extractive industries and the revenues derived therefrom 
has produced “an ideal climate for corruption and poor 
government.  The implications for the most vulnerable 
 
237 African Free-For-All? Investment in Africa, ECONOMIST.COM, (Aug. 30, 2007) 
[hereinafter African Free-For-All?]. 
238 Under Bad Management: Africa’s Bad Management, ECONOMIST.COM, (July 16, 
2007) (describing a seven-year study that monitored the quality of governance in 
several African nations; according to this study, the majority of countries 
considered scored poorly on markers such as corruption, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and choice, and accountability).  See also African 
Free-For-All?, supra note 237 (exploring the effects of the resource curse in Africa). 
239  TRUTH ABOUT DIAMONDS, supra note 21, at 4.  For example, “[w]hile 
[Angola] is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, now pumping almost 
two million barrels of oil a day, its people are among the poorest on earth.”  Celia 
W. Dugger, Angola’s Governing Party Wins in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008. 
240 African Free-For-All?, supra note 237. 
241 Kalley, supra note 97, at 2. 
242 Id. 
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communities have been disastrous.”243   This is demonstrated by 
the fact that despite having considerable oil reserves, the ROC is 
such an impoverished state.244   
5.2. Corruption in Government 
As alluded to in the previous subsection and described 
elsewhere throughout this paper,245 corruption in government is 
rampant in the ROC.  At present, such corruption largely pertains 
to a lack of transparency as to the State’s natural resource revenues 
and related conflicts of interest by public officials, particularly with 
respect to the marketing of oil.246  Despite having received a large 
debt relief package under the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”)-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) 
scheme in March 2006 on grounds that the ROC was unable to 
meet its financial commitments, the nation’s president and his son, 
along with other government officials, have been charged with 
lavish spending allegedly funded by the ROC’s oil income.247 
In granting partial debt relief to the ROC, the IMF and World 
Bank said the country “‘must address serious concerns about 
governance and financial transparency in order to qualify for 
irrevocable debt relief,’ including reforming SNPC, the state-
owned oil company.”248  However, a recent case against the ROC 
brought in Hong Kong by Kensington, a Cayman Island fund, 
disclosed documents showing that the ROC’s financial managers 
siphoned off state oil profits through shell companies in tax havens 
in order to conceal money from creditors.249  According to court 
 
243 Article 19, Congo-Brazzaville; President’s Son Fails to Keep Incriminating 
Information From Public, AFR. NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007. 
244 Id.  See also Allen-Mills, supra note 105, at 27 (“More than 70% of Congo-
Brazzaville’s 3 m[illion] people live off less than £1 a day, despite the wealth 
generated by its oil industry which earned an estimated £1.3 billion in 2006.”). 
245 See supra notes 100–01, 139–40, 170 and accompanying text. 
246 Global Witness, Congo-Brazzaville; High Court Blocks Bid by Leader’s Son to 
Bury Evidence of ‘Secret’ Payments, AFR. NEWS, Aug. 15, 2007. 
247 Allen-Mills, supra note 105, at 27; Beattie, supra note 102, at 6.  See Global 
Witness, supra note 246 (providing evidence of corrupt practices in governance); 
Republic of Congo: Vultures Circle, AFR. RES. BULL. 17485 (2007) (discussing the 
misdeeds of President Sassou-Nguesso, his son, and other ROC government 
officials) [hereinafter Vultures Circle]. 
248 Beattie, supra note 102, at 6.  See also ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 
93 (describing the specific governance- and transparency-related preconditions for 
the ROC to qualify for irrevocable debt relief under the HIPC scheme). 
249 Allen-Mills, supra note 105, at 27; Vultures Circle, supra note 247, at 17485. 
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documents including credit card and bank statements, such hidden 
funds were used to pay bills related to exorbitant spending by the 
ROC’s president, his son, and other officials.250  Among the 
spending sprees at issue were $400,000 for luxury hotel bills 
(including bottles of Cristal champagne and tens of thousands of 
dollars worth of room service) run up during two visits to New 
York by President Sassou-Nguesso and his entourage in 2006,251 as 
well as over $50,000 spent on Louis Vuitton and other luxury 
goods by Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso, the president’s son who 
is also a senior executive at SNPC and the Director General of 
Cotrade, the public agency in charge of the ROC’s oil sales.252 
According to the IMF, “the establishment of the long delayed 
anti-corruption observatory and the passage of a sound anti-
corruption law would help establish the appropriate institutional 
framework to improve governance in the ROC.”253  Moreover, 
increasing the quality of governance in the ROC and in 
neighboring resource-rich nations also entails “ensuring 
governments’ access to the fair and legitimate income that might 
be derived from the countr[ies]’ resources, including diamonds.”254 
5.3. Challenges in Investment Climate 
As mentioned above in reference to the implications of 
plentiful natural resources, a lack of transparency lends itself to 
political repression and instability.255  While such conditions have 
potentially adverse repercussions for foreign investors, it is also 
important to note that the fewer the political freedoms, the greater 
the risk and thus the higher the returns for those investors bold 
enough to commit their funds.256  Aside from the unstable and 
repressed political climate, which breeds general concerns 
regarding domestic security, other factors that are likely 
discouraging investment growth in the ROC include, but are not 
 
250 Beattie, supra note 102, at 6.  See also Vultures Circle, supra note 247, at 17485 
(describing the evidence documenting ROC officials’ use of state oil revenue to 
fund extravagant spending sprees). 
251 Allen-Mills, supra note 105, at 27. 
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255 See supra Section 5.1. 
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limited to: high costs for labor, energy, raw materials, and 
transportation; a restrictive labor code; low productivity and high 
input costs; and a deteriorating transportation infrastructure.257 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Although the conflict diamond issue has waned considerably 
since its peak in the mid- to late-1990s and early years of this 
century, diamonds are still being used to finance illegitimate 
causes in some African nations, to the detriment of valid 
governments and citizens alike.  Recent history serves as a 
compelling indication that the Republic of Congo’s November 2007 
readmission to the Kimberley Process, in and of itself, will not 
diminish the country’s trade in illicit and conflict diamonds to any 
meaningful extent.  This is especially true given the profound 
corruption afflicting the ROC government, documented as recently 
as August 2007. 
A considerable portion of the literature on the conflict and 
illicit diamond issue in Africa cites the ROC’s appreciably low 
export tax on diamonds as an incentive for rebels, corrupt officials, 
and other smugglers to use the country as a hub for illegal 
diamond-related activity.  This incentive clearly needs to be 
removed.  Encouraging the ROC to raise its export tax on 
diamonds is concededly not a revolutionary approach.  The virtue 
of this seemingly subtle option, however, lies in its simplicity and 
proven effectiveness in countless situations in both the primary 
commodity context and others as well.  Increasing the export tax 
on a given category of commodities reduces the volume of the 
relevant commodity that leaves a country.  End of story.  Thus, 
instead of passively proceeding on the hope that holding the ROC 
to the less-than-stringent, voluntarily-enforced standards of the 
KPCS will thwart the nation’s illicit trade in diamonds, the 
international community should wage a campaign to convince the 
ROC to raise the applicable export tax.  To be sure, complementary 
measures related to increasing transparency in government and 
resource extraction, as well as eradicating corruption, should also 
be implemented.  Increasing the ROC’s export tax on diamonds, 
however, is the fundamental next step toward winning the war 
 
257 ROC BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 93 (highlighting the history of 
economic problems, labor problems, and social unrest in the country, making it an 
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against illicit trade of these stones, which have proven “to die for” 
for an incalculable number of innocents in an all too literal sense. 
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